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When the Great War erupted in Europe in 1914, the parties involved imagined a quick
war, believing that the troops would be home for Christmas. At the onset of war, the Germans
initiated the Schlieffen Plan, which called for a highly mobile right wing to travel through
Belgium and northern Europe and encircle Paris, while the left wing fixed the Allied forces in
Eastern France. Had this plan worked perfectly, it would have quickly eliminated France from
the war and allowed Germany to focus on its Eastern Front. Modifications to the plan which
weakened the right wing and the lack of mechanized infantry, however, hindered its successful
execution and the plan ultimately failed. In response, the German and allied armies refocused
their plans on maintaining land already gained and outflanking the enemy, resulting in a line
running south from the North Sea to Switzerland. As both sides promptly fortified their
positions along this line, trench warfare quickly ensued on the Western Front.
Trench warfare was a type of positional warfare which resulted from a lack of mobility
and an abundance of firepower. The conflict developed into a war of attrition in which artillery
and machine-guns became the chief weapons employed. As there was no room for any
maneuver except a frontal assault, the warring nations were forced to send wave after wave of
soldiers into no man’s land, directly at the enemy’s heavily fortified position. As the war carried
on, soldiers and civilians continued to die as each nation attempted to drain the enemy of its
resources. This resulted in an astronomical number of casualties, which the involved nations
could no longer deem acceptable.
As a consequence of this bloody stalemate, each side developed new tactics and
technologies to end the horrific violence. Some of these measures, such as poisonous gases
and rolling artillery barrages, were aimed at suppressing enemy artillery and forcing enemy
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soldiers to evacuate their trenches. Others, such as tanks and infiltration tactics, restored
mobility to the battlefield. Troops who managed to break through enemy defenses were able
to continue the attack, bypassing enemy strongpoints and leaving them for follow-up forces.1
The overarching goal was to create a weaker enemy position that the attacking infantry could
capture with more acceptable casualties.
During the spring of 1918, the Germans initiated their last offensive on the Western
Front: the Ludendorff Offensive. During this offensive, the troops clearly demonstrated what
infiltration tactics could accomplish by quickly gaining miles of territory. The Germans,
however, were unable to capitalize on their gains for two main reasons. First, the hungry
troops often stopped the assault after capturing Allied points in order to rest and take
advantage of the supplies.2 Second, the advancing troops moved more quickly than the rest of
the army and thus could not maintain contact, resulting in a lack of support from the rear. The
Allied forces eventually stopped the offensive and, in turn, broke through the German front and
forced a diplomatic end to the Great War.
The conditions of peace established at Versailles were especially restrictive for the
German military, which was forced to limit its armed forces to 100,000 men. In addition, these
men could not be conscripted and were required to serve a lengthy term of enlistment (twelve
years for enlisted men, or twenty five for officers). The Allies imposed these long terms of
enlistment with the goal of preventing Germany from training a substantial army, but instead it
resulted in the creation of a highly trained officer corp. Enlisted men received years of training,
making them highly capable. Also, the fact that the treaty abolished conscription ensured that
only those dedicated to the service of Germany actually enlisted, infusing the Reichswehr with
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zeal. The treaty also dictated the organization of the army and navy, prohibited the creation of
an air force, and restricted the production, exportation, and importation of war materials such
as tanks, airplanes, artillery, and grenades.3 The Allied powers believed that these severe
restrictions would permanently disarm Germany and ensure that it would never again threaten
world peace.4 From the German perspective, however, the treaty was both detrimental and
humiliating, preventing any means of security.
Although the Allied powers intended to maintain the peace after the Great War, the
countries involved realized the need to learn from their mistakes in the event of future conflict.
The unpredictability of war, however, made drawing relevant conclusions extremely difficult
and oftentimes led to ineffective solutions. The French, who saw the folly of attacking en
masse during the war, concluded by 1929 that future victors would again occupy heavily
fortified positions and use heavy artillery against enemy forces. The resulting Maginot Line—
consisting of trenches, machine-gun nests, artillery parks, and other obstacles—epitomized
their anticipation of positional warfare. On the other hand, Germany’s defeat prompted a
more critical analysis of the tactics employed, rendering the idea of reform more acceptable.
Many believed that Germany’s inability to sustain its losses ultimately led to its defeat, a
problem which military thinkers sought to remedy. Among the most prominent figures of this
group was the Chief of Staff, General Hans von Seeckt, who proposed reforming the German
military doctrine in such a way that the future army would never again be drawn into a
stationary war.
As a result of his experiences, Seeckt identified what he believed to be the German
tactical failures of the Great War and revised the existing doctrine accordingly, preparing the
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German army (Reichswehr5) for a new mode of war. Seeckt’s vision was based primarily on
movement and combined arms, which he felt would successfully prevent the recurrence of
trench warfare. He also forged relations with the Soviet Union, allowing the disarmed
Reichswehr to gain access to equipment otherwise forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. As a
whole, these doctrinal reforms and political maneuvers created a formidable, apolitical weapon
with which future generations could wage effective war. Ultimately, Seeckt facilitated the
successful development and implementation of tactical reform within the Reichswehr,
precipitating the transition from a war of position to a war of movement; his attention to
leadership, terrain, and combined arms transformed the army into a capable, modern tool and
for this reason Seeckt emerged as one of the most influential military leaders in the interwar
period.
Given his position of Chef der Heeresleitung (Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr),
Seeckt has been a focal point for investigators. Although their arguments reflect both military
and political perspectives, they usually address the same question: how was Germany able to
rebuild its armed forces while operating under the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles?
Robert Citino argues that Seeckt was instrumental in the 1920s in creating a doctrine that the
later German government (the Third Reich) used as the foundation for Blitzkrieg.6 Citino,
however, does not believe that Seeckt was preparing Germany for an imminent war. Similarly,
Matthias Strohn contends that Seeckt’s reforms were essential in rebuilding the German
military, but his intent was to create a force specifically to defend Germany in this vulnerable
time.7 Contrarily, Macgregor Knox asserts that Seeckt rebuilt the Reichswehr with the goal of
waging war to regain Germany’s status in Europe.8 Knox believes that Germany—and Seeckt—

Page | 5

were indeed preparing for a war with a target already selected. Eric D. Weitz and Erich Eyck
examine the Reichswehr’s role in stabilizing the Weimar Republic and thus consider the role of
Seeckt. To scholars such as these, Seeckt was critical in his dealings with the Weimar Republic
and instrumental in creating a stable Reich.9 Still, there are others who investigate Seeckt’s
clandestine dealings with Russia, such as Hans W. Gatzke and George W.F. Hallagarten. These
scholars assert that Seeckt was the mastermind behind the military relations with Russia which
provided Germany access to vital military experience and hardware.10 Despite the fact that
these arguments are sound, they lack unity.
Although this study provides analysis from a military perspective, it offers a more
complete picture of Seeckt’s role in the Reichswehr both militarily and politically. This paper
concludes that, from an examination of his training manuals and field maneuver observations,
evidence of his dealings with Russia, and attention to similarities later visible in
Truppenführung, Seeckt successfully effected military reform during the interwar period amidst
notable political instability. These changes would create a mobile and efficient German army,
capable of avoiding the horrors of the previous war.
When the Great War began, Colonel Seeckt, the chief of staff to the III Army Corps, was
stationed on the Western Front near Belgium and France. Here, early in 1915, he implemented
a counter-attack against the French around Soissons, which laid the cornerstone for his
reputation within the Deutsches Heer (Army of Germany). A few months later, Seeckt
transferred from the III Army Corps to the 11th Army, where he acted as that army’s chief of
staff on the Eastern Front. Here, the Deutsches Heer not only achieved one of its greatest
victories of the war—the Gorlice campaign— but also gained control of Serbia.11 Germany
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owes both of these triumphs to Seeckt, for he personally composed the plans with which
Germany operated. In the spring of 1916, the Russians launched what might have been their
greatest feat of the war—the Brusilov Offensive—against which Seeckt conducted an effective
mobile defense.12 In December 1916, on the Russian-Romanian Front, Seeckt’s plans allowed
the Deutsches Heer to capture Bucharest, which, in effect, eliminated Romania from the
conflict. Seeckt was then assigned to Turkey, in December 1917, where he was tasked with
preventing the dissolution of the Turkish army.13 When the German General Staff was
abolished after the war, the Truppenamt (Troops Office) was established in its place.14 General
Seeckt was selected to lead the Truppenamt from 1919 to 1920 and rose to the position of Chef
der Heeresleitung (Commander-in-Chief), occupying this role until 1926.15
Although some contemporary generals argued that Seeckt’s aptitude for obtaining quick
and decisive victories should have earned him a deployment to the Western Front instead of to
Turkey; his assignment to Turkey was crucial to the evolution of the Reichswehr.16 If Seeckt had
indeed been on the Western Front at the end of the war, his reputation would more than likely
have been marred by Germany’s humiliating defeat. In addition, Seeckt’s assignment to the
Eastern Front was instrumental in shaping the ideas that he later implemented in the
Reichswehr. During the Great War, Seeckt avoided the stagnation of trench warfare on the
Western Front and instead consistently participated in campaigns dominated by mobility.17
Within these campaigns, he repeatedly saw how smaller units who possessed superior
leadership, training, and weaponry were capable of defeating vastly larger forces.18
As Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, Seeckt did not delay in analyzing his
experiences and drafting plans for reform. The goal of any future army, he concluded, should
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be to eliminate the opposing forces before they mobilized their entire might; this would be best
achieved with highly mobile, well trained troops.19 Seeckt believed that the lack of
maneuverability in the Great War was due largely to the unprecedented size of the involved
armies.20 To remedy this, he suggested deploying smaller armies. Citino puts forward the best
description of how Seeckt envisioned the Reichswehr, writing that “the army of the future
needed only to be large enough to fight off an enemy surprise attack. Its strength would lay in
its mobility, aided by a large contingent of cavalry, well-conditioned infantry, a full complement
of motorized and/or mechanized units, light machine guns, and mobile artillery.” 21
Because of his influence, it is critical to examine the ideology with which Seeckt
operated. Given that the Nazi Party assumed control of the Reichswehr, it is worth questioning
whether General Seeckt forged an army specifically for the Nazis to utilize in their quest to
purify Europe. Although this theory seems plausible, it is highly unlikely given Seeckt’s stated
view of the army’s role. During the short-lived Kapp Putsch in 1920, for example, both the
participants in the attempted coup and the government of the Weimar Republic looked to the
Reichswehr for support. Many commanding officers—including Seeckt—assured both sides of
the Reichswehr’s neutrality. Scholars from Erich Eyck to Louis L. Snyder to Eric D. Weitz argue
that Seeckt’s non-involvement was a direct result of his discontent with the Republic, as
indicated by Seeckt's famous statement, “The Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr.”22
Seeckt was likely exposed to the conservative German National People’s Party (DNVP) ideology
as a result of his upbringing, and, as Weitz argues, he was never a stark defender of the
Republic.23 Additionally, some of the officers of the Reichswehr did belong to the DNVP. This,
however, was likely not the basis of Seeckt’s inaction during the Putsch, rather his inactivity
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came from his love for the Reichswehr. During the first half of the Weimar Republic, the state
was in turmoil; left wing revolutionaries attempted to incite a communist revolution akin to the
Russian Revolution of 1917 while right wing paramilitary groups—such as the Freikorps (Free
Corps)— attacked both left wing sympathizers and Jews alike.24 To make matters worse, the
army lost its unifying element with the loss of the Kaiser in 1918. Cognizant of this atmosphere,
Seeckt realized the importance of preserving neutrality during the Kapp Putsch. His statement
reflected the belief that, if the Reichswehr was to openly fight with its own members, it would
shatter its already fragile unity, serving neither the purpose of the Reichswehr nor the purpose
of Germany.
As Harold J. Gordon Jr. clearly argues, the Heeresleitung (Army Command) “considered
the defense of Germany against external foes the primary mission of the army and devoted
most of its energy toward the creation of a force which would hope to accomplish this
mission. . . . Seeckt believed the army should not be implemented in civil affairs.”25 He also
believed that the military should “only act at home if the government or the Reich was
threatened. He wanted to avoid civil war and saw conflicts at home a job for the local
authorities or security police.”26 With this in mind, it is rather clear that Seeckt refrained from
involvement in the aforementioned Kapp Putsch because he believed that it did not directly
endanger the Reich or the Weimar Republic, and thus desired to keep the Reichswehr separate
from this event, allowing the army to display a necessary degree of neutrality.
Seeckt again demonstrated this philosophy around the time of the Hitler Putsch (or the
Beer Hall Putsch). Originally, Hitler had planned to kidnap Gustav Ritter von Kahr, a right wing
conservative, on November 4, 1923. Due to added security, however, this plan was cancelled.27
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Four days later, on November 8, 1923, Hitler initiated his failed Beer Hall Putsch in Bavaria.
Two days after the canceled kidnapping plan, Seeckt circulated a memorandum within the
Reichswehr, stating that a soldier should be obedient, regardless of the faction in control of the
government. In response to questions regarding the unity of the Reichswehr, Seeckt affirmed
that, “it is our life interest to allay these doubts, so that we can keep away from the Army the
party struggles, which are consuming all other groups in Germany, so that we can serve only
impartial, natural requirements, and not to be turned off from the course by the intrigues of
any political direction.”28 He continued his argument, asserting that “an army, which is united,
and remains obedient, cannot be conquered and is the strongest factor in the State. An army,
which has become mixed up in politics, will break in the hour of danger.” 29 In addition, Seeckt
made the recommendation that soldiers who desire to become entangled in politics should be
immediately dismissed from the Reichswehr.30 It is in this document that Seeckt cemented his
ideology: political impartiality is essential for soldiers whose primary objective is serving the
state. Therefore, despite his nationalistic personal views, it is highly improbable that Seeckt
was acting under Adolf Hitler’s orders or creating a tool for the Nazis. Seeckt was simply
attempting to build an effective army, with which any future government could confidently
wage war.
The successful creation of such an army required a vision. To this end, Seeckt authored
a number of articles, pamphlets and manuals aimed at individual branches of the Reichswehr;
among the most prominent were: Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Leadership
and Combined Arms Combat, or F.u.G.),31 Ausbildung der Schützengruppe (Training of the Rifle
Squad, or A.d.S.),32 Einzelausbildung am L.M.G.: Ausbildung der L.M.G. Gruppe (Individual
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Training with the Light Machine Gun: The Training of the L.M.G. Section, or A.L.M.G.),33 and
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie (Training Regulations for the Infantry, or A.V.I.).34
Although Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Leadership and Combined
Arms Combat or F.u.G.), the first part published in 1921 and the second in 1923, included some
innovations, it did not drastically alter the tactics and doctrine used by the Deutsches Heer
during the previous war. Instead, this manual focused on the reality of the situation that
Germany faced during the interwar period. F.u.G. was crafted to suit the Reichswehr’s needs—
focusing both on defense and offense, allowing the military to prepare for future engagements
while still operating under the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles. With respect to defensive
tactics, Seeckt introduced a new mode of defense—the delaying defense—which was arguably
the most advantageous to the Reichswehr. Seeckt believed that this would enable the army to
impede the advance of its invader until Germany mobilized a strong counterforce or until the
League of Nations forced negotiations.35 Seeckt also examined defense in a war of position,
desiring to prepare the Reichswehr for any situation that may arise.36 Though the inclusion of
positional tactics may not seem wholly innovative, Seeckt’s capacity for foresight is undeniable.
Seeckt adapted the concept of positional defense to suit modern needs, including sections on
anti-air and anti-tank maneuvers to reflect advances in technology.37
With respect to offensive tactics, Seeckt advocated the continuation of Stosstruppen
tactics (Shock Troop tactics, a form of infiltration tactics), yet with considerable emphasis on
combined arms.38 During the previous war, the Germans used this strategy during the
Ludendorff Offensive. Seeckt realized their importance in preventing stagnation in a future war
and therefore cemented them in the Reichswehr’s doctrine. Originally designed to increase
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mobility during trench warfare, Stosstruppen tactics afforded individual leaders the power to
seize opportunities to push the attack forward, preferring to bypass enemy strong points
(which were left for reinforcements wielding heavier weapons).39 The core of these tactics was
the utilization of independent squads, a feature that Seeckt emphasized heavily in F.u.G.40
More importantly; Seeckt outlined the benefits of coordinating infantry advances with machine
guns and artillery, which would provide vital protection for attacking soldiers.41 Given
Germany’s vulnerability, however, the inclusion of offensive tactics in F.u.G. seems impractical;
more attention to defensive strategies would have better served Germany’s immediate needs.
Seeckt’s anticipation of future conflict served two purposes: it preserved the offensive spirit of
German troops (thus keeping morale high, something which Seeckt saw as essential given the
long terms of enlistment) and enabled the training of independent leaders from which the
Reichswehr would later gather its strength.
Through F.u.G., Seeckt did not ignore the elements involved in the Great War but
instead attempted to refine those elements. Above all, Seeckt aimed to avoid the stagnation
and devastation of trench warfare and translate this mentality to his troops. Although the
Reichswehr doctrine as of 1921 required training in positional warfare, Citino made the
observation that “occasionally Stosstrupp exercises were held in practice trenches
(Übungsschützengraben) that still existed on the various training grounds, but so strong was the
prejudice against trench warfare in Seeckt’s military thought. . . that most unit commanders
shied away from such exercises so as not to appear to be in contravention of the new
manual.”42 This description indicates a successful transition from theory to practice,
demonstrating Seeckt’s ability to effectively implement his reforms.
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Following the publication of the first part of F.u.G., Seeckt produced Ausbildung der
Schützengruppe (Training of the Rifle Squad, or A.d.S.) in 1921, a brief manual discussing the
smallest operational group within the Reichswehr: the squad. A.d.S. defined the squad as a
group consisting of one leader and up to seven riflemen, capable of immediate action based on
a leader’s order, and bound together in life and death by the bond of brotherhood.43 It also laid
the foundation for the use of terrain, the development of independently thinking men, and the
utilization of combined arms. In terms of terrain, A.d.S. instructed troops to maximize the use
of cover while advancing. Here, Seeckt declared that the spade (entrenching tool), even when
employed for short halts, can greatly increase the protection granted by the landscape.44 Using
the landscape granted not only protection from enemy bullets, but also from enemy
observation. With the advent of new technologies such as airplanes (and through them, aerial
reconnaissance), the ability to hide troops became increasingly harder. Therefore, Seeckt’s
focus on the use of terrain was both a way to protect the soldier’s well-being and to maintain
the element of surprise. A.d.S. also mandated that every squad leader be informed of the
larger operational goal because he “will oftentimes be obliged to act upon his own initiative. . .
during the course of the engagement.”45 Likely due to his experiences on the Eastern Front,
Seeckt believed that “quick decision and clear desire of the leaders guarantee to us the
advantage in an encounter.”46 He furthermore contended that leaders were capable of taking
advantage of unexpected situations and that this skill required practice. As a result, A.d.S.
established guidelines for training soldiers—from privates to officers—in making independent
decisions. For example, riflemen were to advance under cover and hold fire until they were
within an effective range, yet they were given permission to open fire if they saw an
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“exceptionally favorable target” or if “the enemy is suddenly encountered.”47 This also offered
further evidence for Seeckt’s belief in combined arms tactics, as riflemen would supplement
machine-gun fire by hitting targets against which the machine-guns were ineffective.48 Seeckt
again hinted at combined arms in A.d.S. by requiring all infantrymen to understand the
importance of aircraft and tanks, both friendly and hostile.49 This understanding would enable
different branches to maximize each other’s strengths while minimizing their own weaknesses.
This emphasis on the combined arms between the infantry and the machine-gun units made
A.d.S. innovative for its time. Although A.d.S. was a short manual, it established the foundation
for Seeckt’s focus on independent leaders, effective use of terrain, and combined arms upon
which he expanded in A.V.I.
In conjunction with A.d.S., Seeckt produced Einzelausbildung am L.M.G.: Ausbildung der
Schützengruppe (Individual Training with the Light Machine Gun: The Training of the L.M.G.
Section, or A.L.M.G.) in 1921, believing that “the light machine-gun is the most important
weapon which the Infantry Company possesses for the conduct of fire battle” and he created
this manual to effectively train infantrymen in this weapon.50 Machine-guns were not new by
the time of the Great War; they had existed since 1861 when Richard Gatling patented his
famous Gatling Gun. They were generally viewed as defensive weapons due to their high rate
of fire and capacity, capable of “mowing down” hundreds of men as they attempted to cross no
man’s land. As Stosstruppen tactics evolved, however, machine-guns changed in both their
physical construction and battlefield role, becoming lighter and easier to wield. Since these
lighter variants were easier to move and could be manned by fewer men, they assumed a
different role than their heavier counterparts. Light machine-guns were able to travel with the
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infantry and thus provide better support and coordinated fire, creating temporary fire
superiority, which was essential in any frontal assault. Continuing plans put forth in A.d.S.,
Seeckt explained that close coordination between light machine-gunners and riflemen must be
taught from the beginning of a soldier’s training. Light machine-gunners initially trained as
riflemen before receiving specialized instruction and then returned to train alongside the rifle
squad, reinforcing the idea of combined arms.51 According to A.L.M.G., the light machine-gun
section was to consist of a commanding officer, four light machine-gunners and up to three
riflemen, which improved the ability of the squad to provide support for the infantry.52 As with
the infantry, the light machine-gun section was also trained to utilize the terrain, thus
minimizing its presence.53 During the Great War, machine-guns were too heavy for individual
soldiers to transport; with the advent of the light machine-gun, however, novel tactical
strategies arose. Thus, Seeckt used A.L.M.G. to reinforce his ideas in what he viewed as the
most important section of the Reichswehr.
Despite the innovation exhibited within the three previously discussed manuals, their
highly specialized and diverse nature made them less effective than Seeckt’s next publication,
which succeeded in combining his theories into one comprehensive manual.
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie (Training Regulations for the Infantry, or A.V.I.) was
intended to be read by the majority of the Reichswehr, including both commanding officers and
privates, and was arguably his most influential doctrine (given the broad audience that it
reached). F.u.G., for example, stressed Stosstruppen tactics and combined arms, but it was
A.V.I. that presented these ideas as they applied to smaller groups (platoon or smaller). While
Seeckt dedicated half of his discussion in F.u.G. to engagements based on position, he devoted
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only two pages to this topic in A.V.I. While this may have been to avoid redundancy, it is more
likely that Seeckt recognized the growing inadequacy of positional tactics and adjusted his
doctrine to reflect this. Concerning A.d.S. and A.L.M.G., Seeckt transplanted his ideas regarding
flexibility, terrain, and combined arms and further developed them, using this as a platform to
cultivate a highly mobile army. This manual was simultaneously similar to and different from
the manuals that came before it. It was within its pages that Seeckt articulated his thoughts
and created an effective doctrine—based on Stosstruppen tactics, terrain, and combined
arms—that would serve the Reichswehr, and later the Wehrmacht, decidedly well in the Second
World War.
Seeckt’s discussion in A.V.I. returned to Stosstruppen tactics, but only as it applied to
mobile warfare. The heart of Stosstruppen tactics was preserved in the modern doctrine, which
underscored the importance of flexible commanding officers. Leaders were required to achieve
predetermined objectives, but the course taken to reach these objectives was left unspecified.
Though seemingly peculiar given the normally rigid structure of the military, it made troops
more flexible and thus more efficient. This need for independent action, however, required a
clearer understanding of the goals outlined by superiors. A.V.I. states that when forces meet,
commanders must act promptly and confidently, even though they often must make decisions
“without knowing the facts.”54 During Seeckt’s years as Commander-in-Chief, he was a strong
proponent of brief, yet clear, verbal orders.55 He believed that issuing commands in this
manner resulted in a high degree of clarity and also enabled subordinates to ask relevant
questions to improve their understanding. He also recommended that commanders ride with
the advance guard, allowing them to make their own observations of the terrain. These
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observations, when combined with the reports of patrols, would grant a clearer assessment of
the situation and allow the officer to act decisively and competently.56
Seeckt’s discussion of terrain in A.V.I. differs from his previous manuals, reflecting the
transition between positional and mobile warfare. While terrain is of vital importance in a
defensive position, its advantages had not yet been adapted for offensive maneuvers. Still,
Seeckt envisioned the use of terrain in the advance. As mentioned previously, commanding
officers were urged to personally observe the terrain in order to improve their orders. A.V.I.
also stated that terrain, in conjunction with the “combat order,” should dictate the
advancement of troops.57 In practice, this meant that the men used the land to limit their
exposure to the enemy’s line-of-sight, fire, and aerial observation. Seeckt also expanded his
previous discussion of the spade, believing that it was able to improve the defense of the
troops while attacking. This contradicted earlier manuals —which claimed that digging in
decreased the momentum of the attack—while Seeckt asserted that the spade would increase
survivability and in no way decrease mobility.58 Knowledge of terrain could also be used
against the enemy, as commanders could identify avenues through which the enemy would
likely advance and position their troops to effectively defend against them.
In addition, A.V.I. built on the idea of combined arms, suggesting the formation of mixed
Kampfgruppen (battle groups) to achieve greater battlefield effect.59 During the previous war,
some progress had been made in regards to combining artillery fire, machine gun fire, and the
infantry, but it was the invention of the light machine-gun which ultimately changed how
combined arms worked. Seeckt understood the full potential of this weapon, believing that,
with a high rate of fire, long range, and capacity for sustained fire, these powerful tools should
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provide covering fire for the infantry.60 According to A.V.I., the “execution of the infantry
attack is based on the fact that fire and movements of troops are so harmonized that the fire of
one unit makes it possible for the other to advance.”61 In order to provide continued support
to the infantry, the manual suggests that light machine-gunners advance in a way akin to
leapfrogging: the first unit moves behind the second, which continues to fire, and once into
position, the second team moves behind the first.62 Overall, Seeckt saw the other branches of
the Reichswehr as supplemental to the infantry: “The heavy infantry arms [machine-guns,
artillery, and trench mortars] must break down the local resistance for the infantry which they
are protecting and in the closest cooperation with it, and attack the objectives which threaten it
the most.”63 This close coordination of units would produce the greatest chance of both
avoiding trench warfare and, more importantly, victory.
Defining this vision was not sufficient for Seeckt, however, who realized the need to
implement his doctrine in the Reichswehr as most of the officers were trained in the pre-First
World War era. Each fall, the soldiers participated in maneuvers that Seeckt reviewed. The
reports which Seeckt wrote during his time as Commander-in-Chief proved instrumental in
assessing the direction of the Reichswehr in the interwar period. They serve as evidence that
Seeckt actively oversaw the implementation of his doctrine in the army.
Seeckt’s 1921 “Remarks of the German Chief of the Army Command Based on His
Inspections,” here after referred to as “Remarks, 1921,” showed his disappointment with the
Reichswehr for its loose adherence to F.u.G.64 Seeckt addressed three specific deficiencies in
great detail in this Remarks, 1921, with additional comments regarding the men. First, he was
impressed by neither the education of the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) nor the ability of
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officers to convey orders. Due to the poor performance of the NCOs, Seeckt mandated that
their education be equal to that of the commissioned officers in the following year.65 Second,
he was fully dissatisfied with the manner of issuing orders. He remarked that discussions
following exercises were oftentimes too lengthy, contending that “long discussions are dull,
short ones are effective.”66 To remedy this, he recommended that all commanding officers
deliver a brief, verbal order that the recipient would then repeat. The subordinate was
encouraged to ask questions until he fully understood both the specific order and the overall
objective (a suggestion that would later appear in A.V.I.).67 Last, Seeckt strongly discouraged
the use of a map, as commanders should base their orders on their knowledge of the terrain.68
He preferred this method as it was often quicker to reference and easier to understand.
Regarding the men, Seeckt noted that the physical fitness of the soldiers was not
sufficient, as most arrived tired and weary after a march. He recommended increasing
endurance and strength in the coming year, suggesting that soldiers participate in sports during
their leisure time; this was also advantageous as the competitive nature of such activity would
improve training.69 Second, he commented on the enthusiasm of the troops. Seeckt was
impressed by their youthful zeal and recommended that commanding officers do everything in
their power to maintain this, given the long enlistment period mandated by the Treaty of
Versailles.70
Seeckt’s last concern in 1921 involved the notion of combined arms. Although he had
published F.u.G. earlier that year, the troops of the Reichswehr did not adhere closely to his
doctrine. Seeckt noted that the level of training amongst light machine-gunners was below that
of the riflemen, that the “infantry company still neglects its chief weapon, the light machine
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gun,”71 and that weapon specializations (Waffen-Partikularismus) had developed in the officer
corps. Addressing the first two concerns, Seeckt recommended that the machine-gun units and
the infantry merge.72 He maintained that this would not only improve the education of
machine-gunners, but also provide an opportunity for the infantry to better acquaint
themselves with the advantages of the light machine-gun. As for weapon specializations,
Seeckt commented that “we must lay greater stress on the training of detachments of
combined arms and on making effective, through co-operation, the centralization of the
purpose of the maneuver and teaching the troop leaders and the infantry the indisputable time
requirement of the other arms, especially the artillery.”73 General Seeckt believed that
riflemen equipped with telescopic lenses (snipers), trench mortars, machine-guns, and artillery
were all instrumental in aiding the advance of the infantry.74 More importantly, Seeckt noted
that troops were still employing these weapons in a way representative of positional warfare,
not as described in F.u.G. He responded to this oversight, stating: “The destructive effect of
artillery, which permits weaker infantry to pick the fruits of the victory, can only be executed in
movement warfare. . . . Experience in stabilized warfare cannot be made use of in movement
warfare.”75 Through this comment, Seeckt hoped to make his officers aware of not only the
benefits of artillery fire or the capabilities of smaller forces, but also the limitations of relying on
previous experience in the Great War. He envisioned a future war being one of movement and
was determined to train the Reichswehr for this reality despite the resistance he initially
encountered.
The following year, General Seeckt again observed the fall maneuvers and reported his
comments. The 1922 Comments were similar to his previous Remarks, as Seeckt criticized the
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troops for not adhering to F.u.G., discussed the importance of flexible leaders, and stressed the
importance of combined arms. Despite these similar criticisms, he observed progress in
different areas. With regards to the general training, Seeckt observed that the individual
branches were becoming acquainted with one another, but that the smallest unit—the squad—
needed improvement.76 Although Seeckt had addressed squad training in A.d.S. (published in
late 1921), he made several further comments in his 1922 Comments. According to these
additions, squad leaders were to live with their men to better understand their character and
needs. He also calls for the education of leaders in such a way that they become “thinking
fighters.”77 Along these lines, he reiterated that “the advance guard commander must usually
act before he has obtained all information necessary for a correct decision. It is the fate of the
advance guard always to cope with an unclarified [sic] situation,”78 something he referenced in
his Remarks, 1921 and in A.d.S. The 1922 Comments also demand continual movement in the
field to prevent stalemate. In addition, Seeckt also made a few comments regarding the
continued dependence on the map and the lack of entrenching.79 With regards to combined
arms, Seeckt noticed a clear deficiency in the communication between the infantry and the
artillery, leading to numerous accounts of infantry attacks without proper fire support. In turn,
this “erroneous withholding of artillery costs infantry blood.”80 If there is a lack of artillery, the
Comments call for the use of the trench mortar to stand in for or supplement artillery fire.81
The 1922 edition of General Seeckt’s Comments addressed many of the same topics that
his 1921 Remarks introduced: leadership, terrain, and combined arms. His 1922 Comments,
however, were not as extensive as the previous ones. This suggests that the Reichswehr likely
succeeded in implementing Seeckt’s suggestions and began advancing toward a mobile warfare
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doctrine. It is also worth noting that both A.d.S. and A.L.M.G. were in circulation for less than a
full year before these fall maneuvers occurred. The fact that Seeckt did not mention these
manuals in his 1922 Comments (like he did with F.u.G. the previous year) suggests that the
Reichswehr attempted, and succeeded, to adhere more closely to these training manuals.
General Seeckt was more critical of the 1923 maneuvers, but the troops continued to
show progress in certain areas. Seeckt reported that “good progress has been made in the
study of the new Combat and Training Regulations” but warned that this progress must
continue.82 One plausible reason for Seeckt’s critical nature in his 1923 Comments lies in the
French occupation of the Ruhr. While the Treaty of Versailles declared this a demilitarized
zone, the Allied powers were still permitted to station troops there and on January 11, 1923,
French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr valley and assumed control.83 During this
invasion, the Reichswehr did not intervene. Still, this invasion likely reminded Seeckt of
Germany’s vulnerability and provoked greater criticism in an attempt to strengthen the
Reichswehr.
While touring, Seeckt consistently heard commanding officers argue for the use of
positional tactics in situations that did not necessitate them. These discussions worried Seeckt,
as he believed the army was regressing instead of advancing. To this effect, Seeckt issued the
following comment: “Training in movement warfare is the main thing and should not be
slighted.”84 Seeckt also noted, to his dismay, the lack of hands-on experience with tanks and
airplanes during the maneuvers.85 Although both tanks and airplanes were used during the
Great War, they were relatively primitive at the time. Since the Treaty of Versailles prohibited
both an air force and tanks in Germany after the war, the soldiers were unfamiliar with how to
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effectively integrate the new, upgraded models in their doctrine. Nevertheless, the Reichswehr
had been experimenting with the use of “combat wagons” as early as 1921 and incorporated
dummy versions into their maneuvers, which were numerically insignificant in 1923.86 In
response, Seeckt repeated the essence of his manuals and maneuver observations: “Modern
means of combat must be allotted or assumed more often.”87
During the 1923 maneuvers, Seeckt commented that the commanding officers showed
progress with their maneuvers were compared to earlier ones. One of the major flaws that
Seeckt observed, however, regarded the evolution of Stosstruppen tactics within the officer
corps. He found that officers were influenced by the presence of superior officers, which
Seeckt felt should be rectified immediately.88 He also recommended that fewer intermediate
objectives be assigned. Incremental goals, he felt, resulted in less flexibility and weakened
morale and momentum (as troops, upon achieving an objective, usually halted to regroup and
plan the next course of action.)89 Instead, Seeckt suggested designating targets deep within
enemy territory, a simple extension of the Stosstruppen tactics utilized at the end of the Great
War. This enabled the infantry to maintain its momentum instead of preparing for a counterattack. Still, Seeckt did note definite improvements in his 1923 Comments, specifically
concerning terrain. The troops, he saw, were adjusting their formations to align more closely to
the tactics stressed in his training manuals, particularly A.V.I.90
The main area of focus of the 1923 Comments was combined arms tactics. As a whole,
Seeckt remarked that considerable progress had been made compared to previous years, but
cooperation with machine-gun units was still flawed.91 Seeckt noted that, on many occasions,
the infantry would advance prior to assuring machine-gun support, or the machine-gunners
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would enter combat after the infantry was destroyed.92 Although he does mention some
problems with the cooperation between the infantry and machine-gun units, Seeckt’s main
concern was the lack of coordination between the infantry and the artillery. Seeckt simply
referred back to his 1922 Comments on the matter but made it clear that communication must
improve if the infantry is to have sufficient support to accomplish its mission.93 As mentioned
previously, Seeckt noticed a bias toward trench warfare among the officers, which he again
witnessed in the artillery units. He observed that the artillery were better at executing difficult
orders from defensive positions than executing easy orders from offensive ones.94 As with the
officers, he recommended that the artillery stress mobile warfare tactics. Many of the
problems that Seeckt noted in his 1923 Comments were of the same category as previous years,
yet Seeckt did recognize a degree of progress within the Reichswehr. In fact, Seeckt was able to
strongly criticize the execution of combined arms tactics because the army had already
implemented Seeckt’s previous suggestions. As a whole, the 1923 fall maneuvers showcased
an imperfect yet capable army, transitioning along the path that Seeckt outlined.
The 1924 Observations were even shorter than the 1922 Comments and less critical.
General Seeckt noted that conferences and orders were now shorter, clearer, and less reliant
on maps, suggesting that the Reichswehr had succeeded in implementing many of his plans.95
He also mentioned that individual arms training was good, but that cooperation between
branches could be increased.96 Again, he discussed the issue of leadership, but in this edition
he criticized not the officers but the umpires. During the maneuvers, senior commanding
officers played the role of umpires, assessing and evaluating the results and effectiveness of
enemy and friendly actions. They would report enemy activity in a particular area, describe the
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findings of friendly reconnaissance, and determine the effect of enemy machine-gun fire on
their sector. During this particular year, Seeckt noticed that the umpires tended to restrict the
creativity of the leaders. Seeckt commented that this was detrimental, as commanding officers
would not fully experience the conditions under which they would operate in a real war.97
General Seeckt once again criticized the lack of coordination between branches. As in the
previous year, the infantry often sustained heavy casualties due to a lack of coordination. This
year, however, Seeckt blamed the machine-gun units for improper execution of movement. He
found that, oftentimes, too many machine-gunners moved to a new location, leaving the
infantry with insufficient support when an engagement occurred.98
The 1924 Observations provide a capstone perspective for Seeckt’s reform efforts. The
work was shorter and briefer, which suggested that in Seeckt’s view the Reichswehr had made
considerable progress. It also indicated the emergence of better trained leaders who were
capable and practiced in making independent decisions. Soldiers were also better trained in
utilizing terrain while advancing and employing the spade to increase survivability. The
branches of the Reichswehr were also becoming more proficient in their coordination, despite
the fact that there were still problems to address. Though these comments are specific to the
1924 Observations, they also reflect the trends of the four previous years. These trends create
the image of change that was based on the doctrinal manuals authored by Seeckt. To draw the
conclusion that it was Seeckt’s manuals alone that precipitated reform within the Reichswehr,
however, would be inaccurate. Instead, General Seeckt took a proactive approach and
personally oversaw the implementation of new doctrine in the Reichswehr, documenting his
efforts in his Remarks, Comments, and Observations.
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Although these measures succeeded in reforming the Reichswehr on a tactical and
operational level, they did not accomplish much in terms of preparing the Reichswehr for a
future war, because Germany did not possess modern weapons. The Entente Powers, wanting
to create a lasting peace, sought to permanently disarm Germany. To this effect, France
insisted in 1918 that the Treaty of Versailles be particularly severe. In addition to placing
restrictions on the size and composition of the army, the treaty governed the armament,
munitions, and materials of Germany. Under Article 168, Section 5, the “manufacture of arms,
munitions, or any war material” was restricted to geographical areas approved by the Allied
Powers.99 The treaty also stated that the “importation into Germany of arms, munitions and
war material of every kind” was forbidden and that “the manufacture and the importation into
Germany of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also
prohibited.”100 These three articles effectively ensured that Germany would not have access to
some of the most essential weapons in any future war, and it was these weapons which Seeckt
desired to procure for the Reichswehr and Germany. As a result, Germany could only examine
theory, through publications and observations in other nations. Seeckt, however, firmly
believed that these new weapons would prove pivotal and realized the need for firsthand
experience. As a result, he sought the means to provide his troops with such an opportunity.
Seeckt’s role in the Russo-German military collaboration, which resulted in access to war
materials for Germany, began while he was still a General in the Deutsches Heer. Near the end
of the Great War, Seeckt befriended the Turkish nationalist, Enver Bey. Bey conducted talks in
Moscow with the Russian military (members of the Trotsky circle) on behalf of Seeckt, and by
August 1920 the Russians had drafted a proposal: Russia would agree to formally recognize
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Germany’s 1914 borders if Germany would supply weapons to Turkey. Shortly after this
meeting, the Reichswehr established Sondergruppe R (Special Group R), with the intent of
establishing connections between the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) and the
Reichswehr, presumably under the recommendation of Seeckt.101 Later, a group consisting of
Major Fritz Tschunke, one of Seeckt’s trusted agents and representative, Oskar von
Niedermayer, a former military attaché to Russia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Schubert traveled to
Moscow. Tschunke has the clearest connection to Seeckt, but Niedermayer and Schubert were
also likely acting under Seeckt’s orders. As Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, it is likely
that Seeckt had expressed his expectations prior to their meeting in Russia. Eyck makes the
argument—which partially explains why connections between these three men and Seeckt are
difficult to find—that Seeckt wished to remain as obscure in these Russian-German dealings as
possible, despite the fact that he orchestrated them.102 Through the talks that ensued, the
German firm Gesellschaft zur Förderung Gewerblicher Unternehmungen (Society for the
Encouragement of Commercial Enterprises, or GEFU) was established to safeguard the
negotiations from foreign intervention, and Major Tschunke was assigned to lead it.103
The Russians required Seeckt to personally confirm their deals and at this request Seeckt
talked with the Reich Chancellor and Minister of Finance, Dr. Josef Wirth.104 Before an
agreement could be finalized, however, Wirth stepped down from his position as Minister of
Finance. The Russians then inquired about active military aid against Poland, a request that
Seeckt could not fulfill.105 These problems temporarily halted the Russo-German collaboration,
but on January 17, 1922, Niedermayer returned to Berlin with a possible solution. Karl Radek, a
civilian representative of Russia, who arrived with Niedermayer, informed Seeckt that Russia

Page | 27

planned to attack Poland in the spring and requested German aid in rebuilding the Russian war
industry. Radek proposed a mutual exchange of military literature which would be used to
train the officer corps.106 On April 16, 1922, Russia (soon to become the Soviet Union) and
Weimar Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo, in which Russia “renounced any claims for
reparations from Germany and joined the Reich in a pledge of peace and friendship.”107
General Seeckt feared for the longevity of the treaty, however, and sought to draft a military
agreement with political ramifications. He met with a Russian agent, Rosenblatt (first name
unknown) and from these talks established an agreement entitling the Reichswehr access to
military bases in Russia.108 In return, Russia received the right to learn German “military
culture” through participation in German maneuvers, with a yearly “material reward.”109 The
agreement was finalized on August 11, 1922, in Moscow, through one of Seeckt’s trusted
collaborators.110 Most importantly, the procurement of bases on Russian soil allowed the
Reichswehr to circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, granting them the handson experience that Seeckt so eagerly sought. As a result, Seeckt was able to translate his
reforms from theory to practice, effectively preparing the Reichswehr for future conflict.
Through the aforementioned pact, the Reichswehr was able to establish three programs
in the Soviet Union: Lipetsk, Kama, and Tomka. Lipetsk became operational in May 1925 and
was the first of the joint programs. As an aviation school located in Lipetsk, its primary
objective was to train pilots and mechanics; it was also used for testing aeronautical equipment
and experimenting with new tactics.111 The school ran numerous experiments, ranging from
the coordination of smoke screens and infantry to the development of pressurized cabins
(cockpits) for winter conditions.112 Within the first nineteen months of its operations, sixteen
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pilots, forty-five mechanics and forty workers were trained at this school;113 the following year,
twenty pilots (and twenty-four observer pilots) emerged.114 The second program was launched
in 1926 as a facility for research involving poisonous gasses in Podsinki (code-named
“Tomka”).115 Experiments conducted here investigated methods for dispersing gasses (i.e. by
artillery shells, airplanes, and other delivery systems) and decontaminating gassed regions. The
last major testing zone, a tank school located in Kazan (code-named “Kama”), became
operational in 1929.116 Officers who attended the tank school received a thorough education in
both the theoretical and the applied science of tank warfare; courses treated topics such as
tank mobility in certain terrain, the estimation of distance to a target, and the calculation of
ballistic properties.117 Though both the Reichswehr and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
(RKKA) benefited from the knowledge acquired through the experiments at these locations,
they were not funded equally. While Lipetsk and Kama were primarily paid for by the Germans,
Tomka was a joint program, and each side bore roughly the same financial burden.118 The fact
that the Reichswehr was willing to fund the creation, maintenance, and supply of such schools
shows how vital these establishments were to the Germans.
As mentioned previously, General Seeckt was highly concerned with maintaining secrecy
in negotiations between the Reichswehr and the RKKA. During the signing of the Treaty of
Rapallo and the subsequent agreement drafted between Seeckt and Rosenblatt, the political
situation in Germany was still unstable. Therefore, Seeckt’s involvement in these negotiations
could be seen as a sort of political time bomb. The resulting military collaboration was not only
a direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles, but also a threat to Seeckt’s career. Both rightwing and left-wing political groups in Germany would be unsympathetic to negotiations with
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the Soviets, regardless of their advantages, and disclosure of such talks would further threaten
the stability of the Weimar Republic. These negotiations also required Seeckt to ignore his own
nationalistic ideology, revealing the degree of benefit that he hoped to gain. Yet Seeckt
believed so strongly that these relations were necessary for Germany that he was willing to risk
serious repercussions.
With this newly acquired knowledge of aircraft, gasses, and tanks, a fundamental flaw in
Seeckt’s manuals surfaced. Though each discussed tactical reform, none included these new
weapons of war. This was due not to oversight by Seeckt, however, but because these weapon
systems were illegal at the time of publication. As such, he did not devote large sections of his
manuals to these weapons (although he did discuss defensive measures against them). As a
result, the Reichswehr needed a new training manual, one that discussed the offensive
capabilities of aircraft and tanks in particular. In 1933, Colonel General Ludwig Beck (and
others) authored a new doctrinal manual for Germany: Truppenführung (Troop Leadership).
Eventually published in two volumes, Truppenführung served to update Seeckt’s manuals with
discussions of armored warfare and air power.
The beginning chapters of Truppenführung examined command and leadership within
the army. According to this new manual, numerically inferior forces could wage effective war if
squads combined effective leadership with weapons in good condition.119 Adopting Seeckt’s
doctrine, Beck believed that uncertainty always exists in war and that commanders must learn
to make confident decisions before having fully assessed the situation. In order to accomplish
this, commanders gave their subordinate officers “freedom of action, so long as it does not
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adversely affect his overall intent.”120 This idea of freedom and flexibility is a clear continuation
of Stosstrupp tactics, which Seeckt repeatedly stressed in his own doctrine.
Another important topic in Truppenführung is the utilization of terrain. Like in Seeckt’s
manuals, commanding officers were to give concise oral orders based on terrain, affording
subordinates the opportunity to ask relevant questions.121 As a result, these orders were
delivered more quickly than those requiring a map. In addition, objectives were less
incremental, allowing troops to maintain momentum more effectively.122
The main focus of Truppenführung was that of combined arms, in which the goal was to
support the backbone of the army: the infantry. In agreement with Seeckt, Beck asserted that
heavy weapons (machine-guns, mortars, mine-throwers, and so on) should always support
advancing infantry.123 This idea of combined arms reappeared in volume two, when Beck
introduced chapters relating to tanks and airplanes. The infantry was to protect the tanks as
they advanced, and airplanes were to act as close fire support for the tanks.124 In Beck’s view,
there was no rigid structure that stated which branches could support other branches; instead
he maintained that “the individual arms must augment each other based on their capabilities
and the nature of the terrain.”125
Although Truppenführung did introduce new tactics, the core was not unlike the
manuals that General Seeckt produced ten years earlier. General Seeckt’s influence in military
affairs continued after his time as Chef der Heeresleitung, as his ideas became manifest in
Truppenführung and thus the Wehrmacht. The Second World War saw the advent of a war of
movement, where troops carefully maneuvered around the battlefield and avoided the
stagnation of trench warfare. The difference in warfare was due largely to the innovations of
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the interwar period, as pioneered by General Hans von Seeckt. His innovations ensured the
advancement of the army despite the severe restrictions levied by the Treaty of Versailles. The
reformation of the Reichswehr realistically occurred in three stages: a vision, provided in his
training manuals; implementation, documented in his observations; and continuation,
guaranteed by Truppenführung. Seeckt’s reformations molded the army into a highly efficient
weapon, wedded to a doctrine of independent leadership, effective use of terrain, and
increased cooperation. His political dealings with Russia procured vital training for his soldiers
with modern weapons and technology, and his tactics were adapted into the operational
doctrine of the Wehrmacht, ensuring his lasting influence within the German military. Overall,
Seeckt sought to create an apolitical entity capable of serving the future leaders of Germany.
Given the later successes of the Nazi war machine, it can be confidently asserted that General
Hans von Seeckt effectively reformed the German army, building a mobile force governed by
superior tactical doctrine.
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